I am a professor of human resources at Goethe University in Frankfurt. My courses on Bachelor, Master, MBA and PhD level focus on how to make organizations more efficient while increasing the welfare of workers.
My research is on human resources, organizational and personnel economics. I carry out randomized controlled trials (RCTs) with and within firms and analyze observational career and promotion data. I also do applied theory on careers and talent management. My second main field of interest is how institutions shape the accumulation and allocation of human capital, focusing on problems of families, gender, and migration.
I am a fellow at CEPR, IZA, and a VP of SIOE, a founding member of the Organizational Economics Committee of the German Economic Association (VfS), a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of Sciences Po, and of ConTrust at Goethe University. I am also Scientific Director of CLBO.
Before joining Goethe, I held positions at the Toulouse School of Economics and EHESS, and at SITE, Stockholm School of Economics.
Incentives to Discover Talent (with Tobias Brünner, Richard Holden and Suraj Prasad), The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 38, Issue 2, July 2022, Pages 309–344:
We study an agent’s incentives to discover where her talents lie before putting them to productive use. In our setting, an agent can specialize and learn about the same type of talent repeatedly, or experiment and learn about different types of talent. While experimentation is efficient for a range of distributions of talent and initial signals, labor-market institutions play a crucial role for individual incentives to experiment. Institutions that give the agent sufficiently large bargaining power, provide incentives for experimentation, but for weak bargaining power, agents specialize. We also look at how competition in the labor market, human capital accumulation, and correlation across talents affect incentives to experiment.
Underrepresentation of Women in the Economics Profession More Pronounced in the United States Compared to Heterogeneous Europe (with Emmanuelle Auriol, Alisa Weinberger and Sascha Wilhelm), PNAS
The Long-term Consequences of a Pay Change (with Miriam Krüger), Journal of Labor Economics
In a professional services firm, top management unexpectedly adjusted the pay of consultants in some divisions to the pay in other divisions. In this quasi-experiment, fixed wages increased and bonuses decreased, reducing pay for the high and increasing it for the low performers. Individual outputs and efforts decreased by 30%, and attrition and absenteeism increased. The effects are driven by those who were rationally expecting to lose from the pay change. Observing a period of more than three years, we show long-term negative reciprocity of those affected, but no negative selection effects of new hires.